

STABILITY IN THE BALTIC STATES

by

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INTRODUCTION

THIS study embraces a survey of salient events occurring since the end of the World War in each of the Succession states of the Russian Empire, with a view to forming an objective judgment on the forces at work for stability and internal peace in each.¹ To estimate the degree of stability in any given region involves an analysis of the interplay of those cohesive and disintegrative forces entering into the internal structure of each state. Stability is, then, the resultant of the social structure and conditioning environment—the product of domestic forces. While it is virtually impossible in a complex world completely to dissociate internal from external factors entering into any given situation, the principal objective here is the appraisal of the elements of strength and weakness in the

respective countries at the present time, leaving for separate treatment, under the caption of security, those external forces which bear on the international position of each state, and condition, for good or ill, its interrelationships to other states.

The method of such an inquiry is different: it is synthetic and not analytic; it demands the convergence into focus of the various forces giving to states their particular position at the present day. Stability is estimable by dead reckoning—by the systematic dissociation and evaluation of factors within a given field; the index of security, on the other hand, is arrived at by an associative process: it is the resultant of computation of numerous converging and conditioning forces of an interrelated world.

FINLAND

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

The emergence of Finland from the Russian fold in 1918 was not effected without a short, but intensely bitter, civil war. Because of her position in adjacency to the group of northern neutrals, Finland was felt to form an excellent base from which revolution could be spread westward into Europe. To convert the former Grand Duchy into a Soviet republic became, accordingly, one of the initial missionary enterprises of the Communist faith. But the effort to spread communism by fire and sword among a basically democratic people, steeled in defense of their native institutions by the excesses of Czarism, proved a distinct failure. The bourgeois classes of Finland, along with the land-owning peasantry, crushed the imported revolution in the field, thanks to

German assistance. The civil war, however, left a legacy of social bitterness between the bourgeoisie and peasantry on the one hand, and a large part of the Social Democratic urban population and a small rump of Communists on the other, which a decade of political independence and stable, orderly government were not able totally to efface. After the civil war the Finnish Social Democratic party returned to the fold of evolutionary methods and abandoned subversive tactics. It devoted its attention to strengthening its parliamentary position, becoming, as in Germany, easily the largest political party, and endeavored through comprehensive social legislation and a fostering of the trade union movement to consolidate its position with the working classes. The rump of Communists, in definite political alliance with the Third International, separated from the Social Democrats, organized

1. Bibliography of this report will be sent upon request.

as a Communist party, and until 1923 carried on typical Communist activity. Following the discovery of a plot against the security of the state in 1923, their activity as a party was officially outlawed, but in subsequent elections, under one pseudonym or other, a Communist ticket was presented. In the parliamentary elections of July 1-2, 1929, held at a time of economic depression which has since become intensified, the Communist contingent conquered twenty-three seats out of a Diet comprising 200 members.² Strengthened by this success, the Communist groups set out to control the trade unions if possible, and, where successful, to restrict union membership to Communists. This type of activity was bitterly resented by workers of other political inclinations as "terrorism." A final step taken by the Communists, obviously at the instigation of Moscow, was the introduction in 1929-1930 of active anti-religious propaganda as a means of breaking down the resistance of the strongly pietistic Finns to revolutionary ideas. Under a liberal press régime, which dealt with press offenses through presidential ordinance, propaganda against Finnish institutions was allowed considerable leeway. The decision of the Communist leaders to select the town of Lapua, for over eighty years the stronghold of a pietistic Lutheran sect, as the center of an anti-religious demonstration-festival at the end of November 1929 was the culminating factor in arousing and mobilizing latent psychological resistance, and galvanizing it into an effective counter-movement.

ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTIVITY: THE LAPUA MOVEMENT

The demonstration planned for Lapua was not permitted to take place, not because of official police prohibitions, but because of the emergence from the countryside of a volunteer vigilantist group which dispersed the attempted gathering of four hundred Communist atheists. Following this, a mass meeting of farmers and peasants, under Lutheran auspices, gathered in Lapua on December 1, 1929 to present demands to the government for the effective suppression of communism. Beginning in the province of

Ostrobothnia, this movement, under the fiery leadership of Vihtori Kosola, who has been described as a Finnish Mussolini, finally spread throughout the country.³ Delegations bearing the demands of the movement descended upon Helsingfors to put their memorials before the government and demand action.

The response of the Kallio cabinet, composed of Agrarians sympathetic to the Lapua movement, Progressives looking askance at its illegalities, and Social Democrats who held the balance of power in the Diet, could hardly be vigorous. A bill was introduced to enlarge the powers of the government over the organization and dissolution of societies, and was quickly passed. When, however, a second bill aiming to control the press by legislative action came up for discussion, the Social Democrats, in response to the demands of their central organization, succeeded in killing it.⁴ The hope of the leaders of the Lapua movement, that it might be possible to proceed by lawful means against what they deemed subversive elements, now seemed doomed to disappointment.

It was not long before direct action followed. On March 28, 1930 the Lapua leaders wrecked the plant of the *Työn Ääni* (The Voice of Labor), a Vaasa Communist sheet,⁵ on account of "the license of its articles." This inaugurated a period of sporadic vigilantism, which presently assumed the form of systematic kidnapping of Communist leaders and their detention for a few days under harrowing circumstances, followed as a rule by release at some point distant from the scene of the abduction, or by ejection across the eastern border. In the face of these acts of normally law-abiding citizens, the police, the civic guards and the frontier patrols were impotent, and an administrative paralysis, which crept from Vaasa to Helsingfors, became patent. The movement next assaulted the judiciary; it was a simple expedient to abduct the attorney for the plaintiffs when vigilant-

3. For a review of the beginnings of the movement, cf. *Goteborgs Handels-Tidning*, April 23, 1930, and Lauri Ingman, *The Lapua Anti-Communist Movement in Finland* (Helsingfors, 1930), p. 3.

4. Ingman, *The Lapua Anti-Communist Movement in Finland*, cited, p. 10.

5. *Hufvudstadsbladet*, March 29, 1930.

2. *Bulletin périodique de la presse scandinave*, No. 204, p. 6.

ist activities came under judicial scrutiny.⁶ With the local government authorities and the judiciary subject to effective pressure, the next objective of the movement became the influencing of the national government.

FINNISH LOCK MOVEMENT

While the Lapua movement proper, which proceeded on a purely emotional basis, was undertaking these capricious activities in various parts of Finland, a second and more closely knit movement came into being, with far more consciously directed objectives. If Pastor Kares, father-confessor to the Lapuans, could proclaim with all sincerity that "the Lapua movement was national and religious merely, and that there was nothing of an economic theory in it,"⁷ the same could not be said of the *Suomen Lukko* (Finland's Lock) movement, which assailed the economic power of Communists by appealing to patriots to discharge Communist employees and not in the future to employ in any capacity those who subscribed to Communist principles. In addition it favored the education of public opinion to its view of individual political and economic liberty.⁸

The convergence of these two movements took place in July 1930, when Kosola and his lieutenants organized, with the support of the *Suomen Lukko*, an imposing mass demonstration for a "March on Helsingfors" mildly imitative of the famous Fascist exploit. But before the arrival of the contingents of picked Lapua men in the capital, two significant events took place: (1) on the assembling of the Diet in extraordinary session on July 1, Premier Kallio secured from that body a "bill of immunity" for the government to cover its admitted illegalities in the suppression of Communist newspapers;⁹ and (2) laid before it certain propo-

sals for constitutional reform which, in his opinion, would give to the government adequate powers to deal with the Communist movement. Having been officially vindicated by the Diet, Kallio thereupon resigned to permit the formation of a broader all-bourgeois coalition cabinet.¹⁰ After the reference of the bills to the Constitutional Commission of the Diet, members of the Lapua movement on July 5 openly entered the Diet building, invaded the commission's sessions and abducted the two Communist members. These events demonstrated the powerlessness of the government to maintain law and order, as well as the strength of the popular movement. It was manifestly necessary to bring the government into accord with the masses.¹¹

When, therefore, Kosola and twelve thousand of his followers marched upon Helsingfors on Sunday, July 7, and openly presented their demands to the government they were met by President Relander, who expressed general approval of their actions, by General Mannerheim, the *père de la victoire* of the Finnish Civil War, who added his benediction, and by a cabinet almost entirely recast¹² to include strong nationalists and extra-parliamentary leaders, and headed by the Grand Old Man of Finland, Judge Svinhufvud.¹³ It was plain that the period of governmental temporizing which had doomed the Kallio ministry was over.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

The Svinhufvud government was forced to give its attention to the constitutional measures laid before the Diet by its predecessor. The first of the reforms proposed by Kallio was openly anti-Communist, seeking to "forbid the entrance into parliament of members of a party working for the over-

6. In the trial of the *Työn Aäni* case, the chief attorney for the owners of the paper, Mr. Asser Salo, was kidnapped and taken over the border into Sweden on June 4. This disrupted the trial, which was postponed to July 9. By that time the Lapua movement had reached such proportions that the case could not be disposed of. For the full documents in the case, cf. *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, June 7, 1930.

7. *New York Times*, August 31, 1930.

8. *Bulletin périodique de la presse scandinave*, No. 212, May 29, 1930; Ingman, *The Lapua Anti-Communist Movement in Finland*, cited, p. 10-13; *New York Times*, August 26, 1930.

9. The convocation of the Diet followed closely a mass meeting of the Lapua leaders which called upon the government to close Communist printing establishments and suspend their journals, liquidate Communist organizations under whatever guise they might appear, imprison Communist leaders, agitators and their supporters, and enact laws validating such action. (Cf. *Hufvudstadsbladet*, June 12, 1930.) Kallio im-

mediately announced the drafting of laws on the press and the defense of the state, and authorized provincial governors to suppress Communist newspapers if they thought it necessary for the maintenance of order and peace. (*Bulletin périodique de la presse scandinave*, No. 214, August 7, 1930, p. 7.)

10. *Helsingin Sanomat*, July 3, 1930.

11. Ingman, *The Lapua Anti-Communist Movement in Finland*, cited, p. 14; *Taloniikan Marssi*, p. 4.

12. *Hufvudstadsbladet*, July 4, 1930.

13. Ingman, *The Lapua Anti-Communist Movement in Finland*, cited, p. 14; *Helsingin Sanomat*, July 5, 1930. Of the thirteen ministers, only seven belonged to the Diet. At no time were the Lapua leaders brought into the government, however, nor did they put forward any demand to that end. (*Uusi Suomi*, July 5, 1930). Foreign Minister Procopia was the sole survivor of the Kallio ministry, his inclusion in the new cabinet being due to the desire to impress foreign countries with the purely domestic character of the Lapua movement and the continuity of Finnish foreign policy.

throw of the State, likewise their right to sit in municipal councils";¹⁴ another was intended to "restrict the possibilities of a misuse of the freedom of the press for subversive propaganda";¹⁵ a third—the so-called Law for the Defense of the Republic—sought to give the government power to deal with an emergency by ordinance.¹⁶ Inasmuch as these provisions clearly conflicted with the Bill of Rights, they partook of the nature of constitutional amendments which require a two-thirds vote for their enactment, a dissolution or delay until the meeting of the next Diet, and then repassage by a two-thirds majority. It was a simple enough matter to put the bills through the first two readings and then to bring them, by interparty caucus and negotiation, into a form representing the composite views of the bourgeois coalition backing Svinhufvud and the Social Democrats led by Mr. V. Hakkila. As thus agreed to, the measures were reported for third reading. The Social Democrats had fought inch by inch, however, against the extreme extension of governmental powers demanded by Svinhufvud, and their substitute amendments had considerably tempered the bills. They were prepared, if the government assented to their proposals, to accept urgency procedure, which involved a vote by a five-sixths majority. Svinhufvud, however, was insistent upon the passage of the bills in the form in which he favored them, so that although they easily received a two-thirds majority—the twenty-three Communist seats being vacant¹⁷—the Social Democrats were able effectively to prevent their adoption under urgency rules.¹⁸ Svinhufvud might have allowed

the matter to rest until the next election, which would normally have come in 1932, but in the face of the demands of the Lapua leaders, he had no choice but to dissolve the Diet. This he did on July 15, 1930 with the full consent of President Relander, setting the date for the new elections for October 1 and 2, and for the assembling of the new Diet on October 20.¹⁹

The outstanding problem in the post-dissolution period was whether the government parties could muster a two-thirds majority out of the elections wherewith to complete the constitutional reform. It was obvious that no Communist ticket would be in the field, as most Communists were under cover, many had voluntarily gone to Russia, and others had been forcibly assisted across the frontier. All forms of exit and intimidation could not, of course, dispose of the 128,000 votes that had been cast for the Communist ticket in the elections of 1929, and it was generally agreed that any Communists participating in the elections would cast their votes for the Social Democratic list. With a normal Socialist membership of 59 out of a Diet of 200, and with 25 Communist seats to be disposed of, the chances seemed extraordinarily good for the Social Democrats to control at least 67 votes after the election, an eventuality which would give them the power to block permanently Svinhufvud's desired reforms. If this were the case, an impossible situation would arise, opening the possibilities of civil war; if, on the other hand, the bourgeois coalition should command the necessary 134 votes, the Lapua movement would emerge from the electoral campaign successful and be able to enact its basic program into law.

THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

Between July and October the force of the Lapua and Finnish Lock movements was brought to bear upon the political parties. Within a fortnight of the dissolution, prominent men in the Lapua movement kidnapped the Social Democratic leader, Mr. Vaino Hakkila, took him to a wild spot in northern Finland and ordered him to prepare for his

14. According to the *Helsingin Sanomat*, July 2, 1930, the bill deprived of eligibility to public office anyone belonging to a society, organization or other association whose aims included the direct or indirect overthrow, by violence or by any other illegal manner, of the social and governmental order in Finland, or representing such a society, organization or association, or who in any other manner showed himself favorable to acts tending to such ends. Its enforcement was to be left to the central electoral commission from whose decisions appeal could be made to the supreme administrative court.

15. *Ibid.* This involved "the modification of certain articles of the law on the liberty of the press and of Article 24 of Chapter 16 of the penal code."

16. Such ordinances, issued on the basis of the new law, were to be brought immediately to the attention of the Diet and to be abrogated in so far as it might decide. (*Ibid.*)

17. On July 8 the Svinhufvud cabinet ordered the arrest of all the Communist deputies; on the following day the Diet gave its approval. (*Helsingin Sanomat*, July 10, 1930.)

18. One bill, on the reform of municipal elections, actually passed and was not held up by a sufficient number of votes to force a dissolution; the others were able to obtain only a vote of 105 to 66. In the opinion of the *Helsingin Sanomat*, the substitute measures sponsored by M. Kivimäki would have

counteracted the criminal activity of Communists as efficaciously as the government bills, and on a surer juridical foundation. (*Ibid.*, July 15, 1930.)

19. *Uusi Suomi*, July 15, 1930.

execution. After protracted parleying, during which he managed to clear the Social Democrats of complicity in Communist propaganda, he was released, but it was clear from that moment that the Lapua movement would make short shrift of the Social Democrats also, if it were necessary to do so to carry out its program. Thereafter systematic abductions of all Communist members of municipal and local government bodies took place, with here and there a Socialist as well, and the government was finally forced, early in September, to appeal to the leaders to keep their cohorts in control, and to return to the paths of legality.²⁰

Meanwhile efforts to build a solid bourgeois electoral cartel proved unavailing. The result was that the parties ran individual tickets, hoping for some distinct benefits out of the electoral *mêlée*.²¹ The Lapua movement did not attempt to enter the field with a ticket of its own. Indeed Kosola issued, the day after the dissolution of the Diet, a manifesto declaring that members of the movement should hold aloof from appearing "in party formation," and announcing that the leaders would curb the activity of those attempting to do so. The real activity of the Lapua movement consisted in creating electoral committees in the cities and communes to "supervise the electoral lists" by striking off the names of Communists.²² This, although clearly illegal, was done with impunity.²³ Such disfranchisement was considered an effective re-insurance against communism. At the same time the Svinhufvud ministry by a mere cabinet decision prohibited all Communist activity, forbade "meetings and outdoor celebrations as well as parades and other manifestations of Communist associations, organizations and individuals," and authorized the police to prevent all private gatherings and manifestations of Communists.²⁴

20. *Bulletin périodique de la presse scandinave*, No. 216, October 16, 1930, p. 8, and *Hufvudstadsbladet*, September 5, 1930. The kidnappers of Hakikila were given suspended sentences of eight months on December 17, 1930. Cf. *New York Times*, December 19, 1930.

21. *Bulletin périodique de la presse scandinave*, No. 216, October 16, 1930, p. 8-10.

22. *Le Temps* (Paris), September 27, 1930.

23. This would have been legalized by the Kallio proposals as passed by the Diet.

24. *Helstingin Sanomat*, July 18, 1930.

THE ELECTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS

The elections after an intense campaign were held quietly on October 1 and 2, with a vote 25 per cent greater than at the preceding elections. Thanks to the cumulative effect of the various restrictive measures taken officially and unofficially, and even despite the non-formation of a cartel, a bourgeois majority for the reforms was produced, as indicated by Table I.²⁵

TABLE I
Finnish National Election—1930

Party	Number of Seats	Number of Votes in 1930	Number of Votes in 1929
Progressive	11	64,914	53,301
Agrarian	59	308,003	248,762
Unionist	42	208,090	138,008
Swedish	21	122,579	108,886
Small Farmers	1	19,919	10,154
Social Democrats ..	66	385,820	260,254
Communists	0	11,503	128,164
Total	200	1,120,828	947,529

From the moment that the results were announced, the passage of the constitutional amendments was a foregone conclusion.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

When the Diet assembled on October 20 it found the government deeply concerned over the illegalities born of the Lapua movement. Although the political objectives had all but been attained, the kidnappings continued, culminating in the abduction of a former President of the republic and outstanding Progressive leader, Dr. Kaarlo J. Stahlberg, and his wife. The plot was one in which both the *Suomen Lukko* and the highest officers of the Finnish army, including General Kurt Wallenius, chief of staff, were implicated, and if carried through might have caused grave international complications.²⁶ The vigilantist movement here overreached itself and produced an inevitable reaction. The leaders of the Lapua movement thereupon called upon the vigilantists to surrender to the courts and admit their illicit doings, and some 400 immediately

25. *Ibid.*, October 10, 1930.

26. That Russia was aware of the activities of General Wallenius is indicated by the concern shown by *Izvestia* on May 14, 1930 over Wallenius' visit to the Polish military authorities, which it regarded as evidence of a recrudescence of anti-Soviet activity. (Cf. *Bulletin périodique de la presse russe*, No. 197, June 24, 1930, and *New York Times*, October 20, 1930.)

avowed their participation in various acts of violence. This permitted the Finnish government to proceed against such individuals in the normal judicial manner.²⁷ Svinhufvud was forced to admit to the Diet, on October 23, that "political unrest had been so intense that strong measures by the government would have resulted in civil war and bloodshed, as the Lapuans were determined to accomplish their objects."²⁸ In the face of this situation the cabinet, he declared, "preferred a policy of moral pressure." The government having been vindicated in this attitude by the Diet, in a strict Socialist versus non-Socialist vote, the anti-Communist bills were passed by a vote of 134 to 66 on November 11, 1930.²⁹ This brought to a close the official legislative and constitutional phase of the struggle.

FUTURE OF THE LAPUA MOVEMENT

A national conference of the Lapua leaders on November 22-24, 1930 brought together a thousand delegates to formulate further policies. From their deliberations it was evident that the movement, following the tactics of the Finland Lock faction, was veering ever more clearly in an economic direction, and seeking to produce lockouts of Communist workers and their virtual disfranchisement and debarment from civil rights, together with the confiscation of their property. Closely connected with this was the move to bring about a boycott of Soviet grain products.³⁰ From the standpoint of public law, the effective carrying out of such measures would tend to place Communists in Finland in the same class as the "deprived" bourgeois and religious in the U. S. S. R.

The Lapua movement is unquestionably the touchstone to the socio-political phases of Finnish public life. Those who are its leaders feel that the historic mission of Fin-

land lies in "its striving to act as the forepost of western civilization against the danger threatening from the East." They believe that "the position of Finland is such that sterner measures are needed in this respect than might be necessary elsewhere" and consider that "the Lapua movement is fundamentally striving to strengthen western civilization, religion and patriotism."³¹ On the other hand, dispassionate observers of the movement have felt that "the extra-parliamentary methods of the Lapua movement have weakened legal authority and that it has not been so easy for the Svinhufvud ministry to govern since it came to power." "Unshakeable authority," to use the trenchant phrase of a Swedish journalist, "is difficult to restore."³²

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1931

One of the immediate results of enhancing presidential authority through the widening of the ordinance power was to focus public attention upon the holders of the presidential office. As the six-year term of President Relander drew to an end, the country was plunged into a presidential campaign of unexampled bitterness in which the proponents and opponents of the Lapua movement sponsored the candidacies of Svinhufvud and Stahlberg respectively. The first phase of the presidential contest involved the balloting for an electoral college of 300 members on January 16, 1931. Here the Socialists secured 90 electors, the Agrarians 69, the Progressives 52, the Unionists 64, and the Swedish People's party 25. Computation by comparison with the figures in October elections shows that both the Agrarians and Socialists had lost approximately 10 per cent of their followings, the Lapua movement had barely maintained its strength, and the Swedish party had lost 2 per cent of its supporters. The gain came to the Progressives, and was accounted for by the enormous moral prestige of Stahlberg.³³ It was impossible, however, for a

27. After the passage of the constitutional amendments, judicial procedure was begun at once against many Communists already under arrest. More than 200 cases were in process on November 14, 1930, with fifty-seven already disposed of. (Cf. *New York Times*, November 15, 1930.)

28. *The Times* (London), October 24, 1930.

29. *Helsingin Sanomat*, November 12, 1930. In its opinion there was every reason to believe that in the light of the solution reached the public activity of Communists could be considered terminated and the objectives of the patriotic majority of the country attained.

30. *New York Times*, November 25, 1930.

31. Ingman, *The Lapua Anti-Communist Movement in Finland*, cited, p. 27. A little-noticed phase of Lapuan activity has been its connection with the irredentist movement which looks to the eventual annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland. (Cf. *Pravda*, December 19, 1930, cited in *Bulletin périodique de la presse russe*, No. 203, January 6, 1931.)

32. Adolf Torngren in the *Svenska Dagbladet*, September 8, 1930.

33. For the data, cf. *The Times* (London), January 24, 1931.

pure coalition of Socialists and Progressives—such as has frequently mustered sufficient scattered support to maintain a cabinet in power—to elect a President over the combined Unionist, Swedish and Agrarian groups. On February 16 Premier Svinhufvud was chosen President by the electoral college by 151 votes to 149 for Stahlberg.³⁴ The coalition of the Agrarians, the Unionists and the Swedes was almost complete.³⁵ As in the case of the constitutional reforms,

the vote was just within the limits of legality. Svinhufvud resigned as Premier on March 1, 1931 to assume the presidency. Finland thus entered a new phase in its internal political development with the elevation of its Grand Old Man—a national hero in Czarist days, the main bastion of the White government during the civil war, and dictator-regent in the days of monarchist orientation—to the position of supreme power in the republic.

ESTONIA

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Following its separation from Russia in February 1920, the Estonian Republic in June of that year adopted a democratic constitution which provided for a unicameral State Assembly of 100 members; a system of ministerial responsibility vesting in the Prime Minister all the attributes normally given to a chief of state, for whom no provision was made; an independent judiciary; and democratic local government. As a safeguard against possible abuses, popular initiative and legislative referendum was provided, although financial matters were rigorously excluded from the sphere of direct legislation. A decade of experience with this instrument of government witnessed only one application of the initiative, that relative to religious education, by which the conservatism of an overwhelmingly Lutheran populace defeated the secular program of the ministry of the day. Otherwise, fluctuations in policy were registered by easy transitions from one cabinet to another without formal constitutional change.³⁶

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

The unsuccessful attempt of a small band of native Communists, supported by Russian nationals of Estonian race, to overthrow the government by force in December 1924 demonstrated the overwhelming solidarity

of the democratic peasantry and their intense nationalism. After judicial trials had sentenced to death or to long terms in jail the persons guilty of this revolutionary activity, the only procedure necessary for control of communism was police surveillance, and occasional search and seizure. In the early spring of 1930, however, the assassination of the head of the Tallinn garrison, General Uut, as an act of Bolshevik terrorism, aroused nation-wide resentment, the reaction of the press and public opinion clearly indicating that "the people were in no mood for Eastern experiments."³⁷ In addition to planning and trying out experimental military manoeuvres for the defense of the capital in the event of any possible uprising, the government undertook a new round-up of Communists, discovering an interesting liaison with Moscow,³⁸ and proceeded to the dissolution of the parliamentary Communist Labor party of Estonia—the so-called Kaaver-Socialists—and the proportional distribution of their six mandates among the remaining parliamentary groups.³⁹ Without need of further political action, and solely through administrative vigilance, the Communist movement in Estonia has been reduced to such insignificant proportions that it does not constitute a serious factor in the development of the country's constitutional life. Here the constructive effect of a policy of land reform has been most noteworthy

34. *New York Times*, February 17, 1931.

35. On the eve of the elections it was necessary for Svinhufvud to suspend the Lapuan paper *Aktivist*, edited by Kosola, on account of its "abusive articles" and hints of assassination of Stahlberg, should he be elected. Warrants were issued for the arrest of the assistant editors, but not of Kosola. (*Cf. New York Times*, February 16, 1931.)

36. The pending demands for constitutional change will be discussed under the Estonian Lapua movement, which brought them to the fore.

37. *Baltische Monatsschrift*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (April 1930), p. 258.

38. According to the *Helsingfors Hufvudstadsbladet* (April 5, 1930), the Estonian security police discovered "a vast organization of Communist espionage even in the offices of the Ministry of War."

39. *Baltische Monatsschrift*, Vol. 61, No. 6 (June 1930), p. 396.

in cutting the ground from under potential communism.

ESTONIAN LAPUA MOVEMENT

Without the presence of factors such as operated to produce the Lapua movement in Finland, and in default of any attacks upon their religious institutions, the Estonians witnessed in July 1930 the beginning of a movement among the peasantry which acquired vitality contemporaneously enough to receive the epithet of an Estonian Lapua movement.⁴⁰

In reality the movement would appear to have originated in a general dissatisfaction with the prolonged economic crisis, discontent with certain party intrigues in the parliament and with the electoral⁴¹ system, and resentment at the apparent impotence of the government. Following a series of meetings of farmers in certain south Estonian communes, written memorials were sent to the Prime Minister setting forth demands for protection of agriculture, economies in the governmental administration and specific changes in the Constitution. These aimed at the instituting of a presidency, the reduction of the number of deputies in the State Assembly and the withdrawal of the right of franchise from those not paying state and communal taxes.⁴² The latter de-

mand elicited a violent protest from an assembly of poorer peasant-farmers and homesteaders, which declared that such "machinations . . . aimed at undermining the democratic order in the state." Other demands for change voiced in the press included "breaking the strong-willed absolutism of parliament" and the confining of the legislative assembly to its proper functions of law-making and control, with a view to freeing the government, the electors and the representatives of the people from the oppressive tutelage of the party bureaus. As a concrete step in this direction, the abandonment of the list system while retaining proportional representation for the State Assembly was proposed.⁴³ These various moves in the direction of altering the constitutional structure have as yet borne no fruit. Assemblies to discuss them in the national capital in August 1930 were forbidden by the police.⁴⁴ The government has relied on the putting into force of drastic economic measures for the protection of agriculture rather than on accelerating constitutional amendments to put an end to the *malaise*.

ECONOMIC MEASURES

Being largely a farming country, Estonia felt to the limit the world agricultural crisis, and was among the first to be affected by Soviet dumping of cereals.⁴⁵ Beginning in March 1930, the Strandman cabinet endeavored to find means of coping with the problem of lowered grain prices. "Having categorically declined to follow the usual procedure of tariff protection, then examined and discarded divers systems, Mr. Strandman's government finally came to that of a demi-monopoly."⁴⁶ While running counter to the basic principles of the Democrats and Agrarians, it was seen that such a project was essential, and a bill establishing a partial-monopoly system was adopted by

40. These symptoms of agrarian dissatisfaction are not comparable to the Finnish movement. "While doubtless suggested by the events in Finland," says a French observer, "this attitude of the Estonian peasants presents fundamentally no analogy with that of the Finnish peasants. Rather it may at most be interpreted as a sign of political dissatisfaction. . . ." (*Bulletin périodique de la presse scandinave*, No. 216, October 16, 1930, p. 17.)

41. Cf. the *Tartu Postimees*, August 5, 7, 1930.

42. *Baltische Monatsschrift*, Vol. 61, No. 10 (October 1930), p. 629. Undoubtedly the problem of instituting a presidency—a move which would certainly involve constitutional amendment—is the most important of these demands, and the one most likely to affect the internal stability of the country.

"At the time of the elections to the Fourth State Assembly," declares a leading Democratic journal, "we showed how we could not hope for the reconstruction of our political life and the organization of our national economy by means of an active economic policy until after effecting serious political reforms. The strengthening of governmental power demands constitutional amendments, the instituting of a President of the State elected by the people. The President should have the right to dissolve parliament in case of need and to appeal to the people for new elections—a thing which would tend to check the arbitrariness of party conduct. The people's representatives ought to conform more closely to the will of the people, hence the necessity of modifying the organic law of parliament." (*Tartu Postimees*, August 7, 1930.) Such is the "revisionist" program. On the other hand, it is argued that:

"At the Constituent Assembly where the practical intelligence and vital instinct of the people showed their solidity in spite of the difficult times, the presidential question was debated in all its aspects. In reality there were very practical, well-founded arguments which led the Constituent Assembly overwhelmingly to reject the presidential institution. In simple and logical words our greatest statesman, Jaan Poska, showed that the Republic of Estonia did not need a president. The practice of ten years has demonstrated that his point of view was correct. Other States, in which presidents hold office have

passed through rude upheavals. The life of Estonia, without a president, has, on the whole, developed normally." (Tallinn, *Vaba Maa*, September 9, 1930.)

43. *Revalsche Zeitung*, No. 64, September 12, 1930.

44. It would appear that this was done as an administrative measure at the time of the visit of the President of Poland in order to obviate possible interruption of the official program of events, rather than from a desire to bar free discussion of such questions.

45. *Bulletin périodique de la presse scandinave*, No. 216, October 16, 1930, p. 18.

46. *Ibid.*

urgency procedure on July 12, 1930 and promulgated July 19." The system provides for a state monopoly on rye, a limited degree of price fixing and a state monopoly on all grain imports, which when examined in detail amounts to nothing more than a trade-licensing, rationing system. Thus, without attempting to control exports, except as regards rye, and without assuming direct ownership and operation of the agencies of grain import, the government has established the minimum controls thought requisite for the survival of Estonian agriculture.

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

Estonia, on entering the League of Nations, gave a declaration signed at Geneva⁴⁷ that it would accord equitable treatment to its racial, religious and linguistic minorities—principally Russians, Germans and Swedes. In pursuance of this declaration,

the Estonian State Assembly, on January 5, 1926, passed a law on cultural autonomy⁴⁸ for minorities which has been commended as the most liberal in Europe. The only complaints arising from "minorities" in Estonia are those put forward by the Baltic barons whose estates were expropriated under the terms of the Agrarian law of September 19, 1919.⁴⁹ At the suggestion of the German government, these individuals, who, by every canon of international law, were Estonian nationals, withdrew from Estonia and acquired German nationality. The German government then put forward their special preferential claim to cash compensation for their losses. This alleged collusion the Estonian government has steadily refused to recognize, and persons of Estonian origin who left the country after September 19, 1919 are expressly excluded from compensation.

LATVIA

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Republic of Latvia, with a less homogeneous population than Estonia, and an enormous capital city⁵⁰ to support, came into existence under even more grievous circumstances than either Finland or Estonia. Devastated by both German and Czarist armies, visited by two Bolshevik invasions, and made the stamping ground of the residual monarchist armies of the German and Russian counter-revolutions, Latvia was compelled to delay its constitutional reconstruction until peace had been restored with Russia in August 1920. Under steady, practical leadership in both domestic and foreign policy Latvia established its constitutional structure through an instrument of 1922, which differed from that of Estonia chiefly in that it created an independent Presidency. Reforms in land distribution, colonization of the soldiery on plots of ground taken from the detested Baltic barons, and the building-up of institutions of local self-government

have proceeded largely parallel with those in Estonia. Under more auspicious circumstances, a valorization of the currency and the establishment of the *lat* as the monetary unit was effected by 1922, to the great benefit of the middle class of security holders and merchants. In its treatment of minorities Latvia likewise followed the lead of Estonia, giving an analogous declaration at Geneva⁵¹ and executing it by appropriate legislation. The complaints of the barons whose lands were expropriated have been few, and have not secured the backing of any great power. Owing to the presence of an appreciable number of Catholics in Latgallia, once a province of historic Poland, Latvia has reached, through a concordat with the Vatican,⁵² a satisfactory adjustment of the position and obligations of this religious element, and political life is now singularly free from any religious vicissitudes. Conscious of its rôle as an *entrepôt* country, Latvia has endeavored by calm, objective negotiation to increase its exports of goods to the Soviet Union and has managed

47. *Riigi Teataja*, July 19, 1930.

48. Declaration of August 31, 1923, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Vol. 4, November 1923, p. 1311.

49. *The Estonian Year Book*, 1929, p. 28-30.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 83-86.

51. Riga was formerly the center of the metallurgical and shipping industries of the Russian Empire.

52. Declaration of July 7, 1923, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Vol. 4, November 1923, p. 1275.

53. The text of the concordat is given in the *League of Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. XVII, p. 365, No. 443, and in G. Albat, *Recueil des principaux traités conclus par la Lettonie avec les pays étrangers, 1918-1928*, Vol. I, p. 71-75.

to secure the placing of large orders from the U. S. S. R. in its territory.⁵⁴ Possessing ports more free of ice than those of Estonia, Latvia has likewise increased its transit commerce despite the marked difficulties for the economic hinterland arising from the closed Polish-Lithuanian "frontier." The country has suffered little from Communist conspiracies or agitation, owing in part to the rigorous administrative vigilance of the police,⁵⁵ but largely because its undisturbed existence as the mediary between East and West in commerce has been indispensable to Soviet Russia.

INTERNAL POLITICAL LIFE

Latvia's internal political life has fluctuated between the policies of Agrarian and Socialist coalitions, dependent for the execution of their respective programs upon the moderating support of the numerous bourgeois factions in the *Saeima*. On the whole, the Conservative-Agrarian groups have enjoyed the preponderance of power. The last parliamentary elections, held on October 7, 1928, indicated a trend "away from Kereniskism,"⁵⁶ and evicted from power the Socialist coalition led by Felix Cielens, replacing it by an Agrarian-Conservative coalition under the premiership of Mr. Hugo Celmins, which has proceeded with extraordinary stability in its legislative and administrative program. Its position was strengthened in April 1930, when Mr. Albert Kveisis, vice

president of the *Saeima* and an influential member of the Peasants' Union, was elected President of the republic for a three-year term by a vote of 55 to 36; the vote represented the approximate strength of the Right-Center against the Left parties.⁵⁷ The Celmins ministry was in power for over two years with the Social Democrats as its principal opponents. In March 1931 it was replaced by a new Conservative-Agrarian coalition headed by Karl Ulmanis, five times previously Prime Minister.

In view of the existence of a well balanced Presidency, no widespread demand for constitutional alteration has been forthcoming,⁵⁸ although an irregular movement among the Zemgallian (South Latvian) peasantry was in process in the latter half of 1930, demanding a strengthening of presidential authority.⁵⁹ The likelihood of the far-reaching spread of any such movement would appear to be small, as it lacks any profound economic basis. Latvia is probably suffering less from the present agricultural crisis than its immediate neighbors, owing to the larger internal market in the country and to the increase of its imports and exports. The political stability of the country is appreciably high, due to the diversity of the social structure, the high literacy of the populace, the reasonable balance of the constitutional mechanism and the tolerant treatment accorded to minorities.

LITHUANIA

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1922-1926

The post-war history of Lithuania is roughly divisible into two periods of almost equal length: the period of government under the Constitution passed by the Constituent Assembly on August 1, 1922,⁶⁰ which

was in operation until December 1926; and the period of dictatorship which followed the coup d'état at the end of that year, and extends to the present. During the first period, the country, operating within the framework of a democratic instrument, was under the control of a coalition government

54. Cf. Oswald Zienau, "Die sowjetrussisch-lettischen und estnischen Handelsbeziehungen," *Ost-Europa*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (January 1930), p. 250-260.

55. It is also attributable in part to the rigorous administrative vigilance of the Latvian police. (Cf. *Baltische Monatsschrift*, Vol. 61, No. 9, September 1930, p. 562.)

56. The radical ministry of Cielens was frequently compared by its opponents to that of the equally mild Socialist, Kereniski, in 1917 in Russia. The election, according to the semi-official *Messenger Polonais* (October 11, 1928), indicated the reaction against a socialistic policy and the concentration of the forces of the moderate parties.

57. *New York Times*, April 10, 1930. Kveisis, according to the *Polska Zbrojna*, a semi-official military journal, is a member of the order "*Polonia Restituta*" and is regarded as

very intimate with Poland. His opponent was Mr. Kalnins, the president of the *Saeima* and leader of the Latvian Social Democratic party. The victory of Kveisis, according to the *Wiłno Słowo* (April 11, 1930), was attributable to his large personal following and his personal integrity. The President, it adds, "follows clearly the . . . policy of polonophilism."

58. The Latvian press followed with genuine interest the Lapua movement in Finland and the lesser peasant movement in Estonia. The conservative and bourgeois elements have generally sympathized with Lapuism, while the Social Democrats have been hostile. Cf. *Baltische Monatsschrift*, Vol. 61, No. 9 (September 1930), p. 562, for citation of the views of *Latvis*, *Jaunakas Sinas*, and *Social Demokrats*.

59. *Pravda* (August 2, 1930) records the resolution of the Zemgallian peasant congress in favor of reinforcing the power of the President and giving him the power to dissolve parlia-

composed of Clerical and Agrarian parties down to May 1926; then a ministry of radically different nature supported by the Socialist-Populists and the organized national minorities (Jewish, Polish, White Russian and German) took office. This government, under the leadership of Dr. Mikolas Slezevicius, followed a policy of distinct friendship to Russia, which even permitted the dissemination of Communist propaganda in the few industrial establishments in the country, while fighting the Clerical-Agrarian bloc in parliament with the aid of its minority allies. Such a situation threatened to carry the country further to the Left than a stolid and devout peasantry and a highly nationalist army desired, with the result that resort was had on the night of December 17, 1926, to a bloodless coup d'état. The government, installed with military support, virtually evicted the Left parties from Parliament, received a formal lease of power from a bare majority of the rump parliament,⁶⁰ and shortly afterward dissolved the legislative body without ordering new elections. From December 1926 to September 1929 the government was in the hands of Professor Augustinas Voldemaras, an ultra-Nationalist, supported by a group of Lithuanian intellectuals of relatively high ability, whose convictions were more Nationalist than Socialist or Clerical. In due season, however, this dictatorship of the intelligentsia became government of, by, and for Voldemaras, in that the fiery Nationalist Premier, whose successes lay primarily in the field of foreign policy, fought both the conservative Right and the radical Left and quarreled with his own Nationalist entourage. The persecution and imprisonment of many of the parliamentary leaders weakened the general prestige of the government, and on his return from Geneva in September 1929 Voldemaras was forced by his colleagues to resign. Power now reverted to the President, Dr. Smetona, professionally a philosopher, and to the new Premier, Mr. Antanas Tubelis, a colorless Christian Democrat. The main-

spring of the government was, and continues to be, Dr. Dovas Zaunius, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

From September 1929 to July 1930, Voldemaras refused to vacate his official quarters, hoping that a turn in the affairs of Lithuania would permit his resumption of power. Meanwhile, the Tubelis government liquidated the political heritage from Voldemaras and began the release of political prisoners of the Right and Left, while rounding up Communists into an internment camp, in order that the Ninth Fort at Kaunas should not be comparable to the Polish prison at Brest-Litovsk.⁶¹ When it became apparent to the government that Voldemaras contemplated a return to power with the assistance of a personal following in the army and the possible diplomatic support of a powerful eastern neighbor, he was arrested and interned, and remains under police surveillance and continuous observation.

With the problem of Voldemaras disposed of, temporarily at least, the government has centered its attention on various means for the improvement of agricultural conditions and the widening of Lithuania's markets as the primary bases for building up its power in the country. The government of Lithuania today rests upon the support of the army, which is strongly Nationalist, peasant in origin and virtually casteless, and the commercial classes whose property is bound up with the maintenance of monetary stability and the modernization of the country. By a system of subsidies to agriculture, it strives to retain the support of the farming classes brought into being by the partitioning of large estates under the agrarian reform laws. The government itself is in the hands of a small nationalist intelligentsia neither military nor commercial in its inclinations. Legislation rests upon presidential ordinances and the courts enforce without hesitancy the decrees of the Nationalist régime. The formal basis of legal authority is the Constitution of May 25, 1928, promulgated by Voldemaras, and legitimizing much that was the early work of the dictatorial régime.⁶² It differs from the

ment if necessary. The activity of the papal nuncio, Mgr. Ciccini, along these lines is noted by the Libau Maras Vestmesis, cited in the *Bulletin périodique de la presse russe*, No. 199, p. 5-6, August 26, 1930.

60. Text in M. W. Graham, *New Governments of Eastern Europe* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1924), p. 720-735.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 404-405.

62. Cf. p. 133.

63. Text in *Vyriausbes Zinios*, No. 275, May 25, 1928.

instrument of 1922 chiefly in its explicit reference to Vilna, taken by Poland in 1920 and still held by that country, as the national capital, and in its provisions for the legislative body. No elections have been held under the dictatorship, since there is scant probability that the Nationalist régime would survive a free consultation of the populace; first, because in its earlier phases it unquestionably alienated the national minorities, and second, because of the predominantly clerical trend of the country.

THE KULTURKAMPF

One of the most recent acute phases in Lithuanian politics, which brings into clear relief a basic factor in national stability is the struggle of the Nationalist dictatorship with the organized Roman Catholic Church. Except for a small portion of her people living in the Memel area and in the east of the country, Lithuania is overwhelmingly Catholic; her Polish minorities and even a large portion of her White Russian minorities profess the forms of Christianity which they have inherited from the Western Church. The efforts at dissociation of church and state attempted by certain members of the Constituent Assembly in 1920-1922 proved a failure, and in the end a union of church and state was authorized. The political crisis of May 1926 was definitely connected with the effort of the Holy See to use its concordat with Poland as a political weapon against Lithuania, and only laboriously was a *modus vivendi* arrived at in 1928 between the Vatican and Voldemaras.⁶⁴ Since then, continuous difficulties have arisen in the application of the Lithuanian concordat, inasmuch as the Vatican has insisted on complete control of disbursements to its clergy made from the national treasury, while the Voldemaras régime insisted on retaining financial control. Under such arrangements, which have continued since the fall of the dictator, the Nationalist lower clergy have been treated with signal

consideration by the government, whereas the higher clergy, regarded as polonophil, have fared less well.

Late in 1930 a new development came to light in the effort of the higher clergy to utilize theological students for political propagandist purposes among the younger generation, and in various student clubs throughout the country. As a result, the government decreed the dissolution of the student clubs, in return for which the lower clergy received orders from their bishops, at the beginning of 1931, to cease completely all connection with the government. In retaliation, the government placed under internment the secular leaders of the Christian Democratic party and certain prelates,⁶⁵ and forbade the broadcasting of church services. The outcome of the struggle is by no means clear, and it may well be that a protracted contest is in prospect. Whether the development of a distinctive Lithuanian national church, by a severance of the pontifical connection, may be undertaken as a means for utilizing Lithuanian religious fervor in the cause of political nationalism, remains indeterminate.

MINORITY PROBLEM

Lithuania is less homogeneous in population than either Estonia or Latvia, having fallen heir, *inter alia*, to a large part of the Jewish population forced by Czarist ukase to live "within the pale." However, in making peace with Russia in 1920, Lithuania refrained from claiming extensive territorial regions historically but not ethnologically Lithuanian. Within its present confines Lithuania has an appreciable German minority at Memel, actively supported by the *Reich* government; large Jewish populations in the principal towns; White Russian minorities, practically all of Roman Catholic religion, in the easternmost part of the country, and appreciable Polish groupings in the south and west. Like Estonia and Latvia it gave a declaration at Geneva with reference to minorities, but went further in agreeing to apply in its own territory,

64. Cf. Ladas Natkevicius, *Aspect politique et juridique du différend polono-lithuanien*, p. 199-204, citing the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, Anno XIX, Vol. 29, No. 15, p. 425 et seq., and the *Osservatore Romano*, December 14, 1927, for the text of the concordat with Lithuania. Cf. also Vyriausbes Zinios, No. 264, December 20, 1927.

65. *Chicago Tribune*, January 5, 1931; *Berliner Tageblatt*, January 7, 1931.

mutatis mutandis, the stipulations of the minority guarantee treaties.⁶⁶ A major difficulty in relation to minorities arose through rigorous application of the Sunday closing law in the cities, which operated to the economic detriment of the Jewish population. A recent change in the law, has, however, practically abolished Sunday closing.⁶⁷ Grievances arising from the land reform have affected principally Russian and Polish proprietors, but the Soviet government does not push such claims of its nationals,⁶⁸ and the Polish government, owing to the absence of diplomatic relations with Lithuania, is not in a position to act on behalf of Polish claimants.

The status of the Germans in Memel is governed by the terms of the Memel Convention of May 8, 1924, rather than by the minorities declaration. Complaints by the German minority, strongly backed by the *Reich* government, were brought to the

League of Nations Council in September 1930 but were handled by direct negotiations between Lithuania and Germany. The revival of the "Memel question" marked in a conspicuous way a renewed move of the historic *Drang Nach Osten*, and must be viewed as an aspect of treaty revisionism as well as a genuine minority problem.

The basic problems of Lithuania are political, not economic; their settlement is more dependent on the international situation than is the case in any other country in Eastern Europe. So long as the Polish-Lithuanian controversy remains unsettled, so long as there are threats to Lithuania's territorial integrity, the internal stability of the country cannot be high, nor can it be entirely dissociated from the major problem of security. That is why Lithuania is obliged to defer a number of internal political adjustments until final disposition of pressing external problems.

POLAND

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The political reconstruction of Poland following the World War was not a simple task. With traditions of chronic political disorder behind her, resurrected Poland returned to the fold of nations seemingly predestined to conform to the pattern of behavior she had followed in the years before the partitions. That policy, historically associated with the famous *liberum veto* of an omnipotent Diet and an extraordinarily weak executive, might have been re-enacted in the Polish Republic, had it not been for the forceful personality of Marshal Pilsudski. In his capacity of Chief of State in the formative years of the Republic, Pilsudski successfully prevented such an ascendancy on the part of the Polish *Sejm* as would have attenuated completely the power of the executive. To prevent the recrudescence of anarchy, Pilsudski was prepared to curb the Diet by the use of force, if necessary.

From the end of the Russo-Polish War to 1926, Pilsudski's principal attention was devoted to safeguarding the army from what he believed to be excessive parliamentary control. When such independence of the military from the civil branch of the government seemed threatened in 1926, Pilsudski marched his legionaries into Warsaw and made himself master politically, although refusing the Presidency. The ensuing constitutional reforms were clearly intended to reinforce the authority of the President and to give him a position of vigor and independence. With ordinance power in safe hands, and most legislation enacted by presidential decree, Pilsudski has directed, from his position of either Premier or Minister of War, the main course of Polish politics since 1926, striving to render the *Sejm* impotent without entirely dispensing with it, and endeavoring to govern, in so far as possible, by means of a group of administrators—the successive "cabinets of colonels"—drawn from the ranks of the army. The results of such a policy have been to produce a bitter clash between the elements represented in the *Sejm* and the new nucleus

66. This wider declaration has made it possible for the League of Nations to apply to Lithuania the procedure on minority petitions not involved in the commitments of Estonia and Latvia. Declaration of May 12, 1922, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Vol. 3, June 1922, p. 584, 588.

67. Trading is permitted, except at Kaunas, on Sundays and other holidays, with the exception of six national holidays. (Cf. the Lithuanian Telegraph Agency Service, *Economic and General Bulletin*, No. 9, October 1930, p. 19.)

68. *Ibid.*, No. 6, June-July 1930, p. 8-9, 16.

of bourgeois industrialists who have come to the support of the Pilsudski régime. In the process, the dissident minority elements unrepresented in the government have hardly fared well.

A veiled dictatorship by Pilsudski, acting through President Moscicki, with the assistance of the leading officials of the army, irrespective of the wishes of Parliament, characterized the situation in Poland in the middle of 1930. Since that time the controversy between Pilsudski and the *Sejm* has been marked by a dissolution of the legislative body, and the imprisonment of many of its members, followed by a heated electoral campaign, an election accompanied by unusual violence, and a new ordering of forces in both branches of the legislative body. The period covered by the latter half of 1930 was also characterized by a drastic treatment of the Ukrainian minorities in Eastern Galicia and the German minorities in Polish Upper Silesia.⁶⁹

THE DOWNFALL OF THE DIET

The constitutional quarrel between the government and the Diet concerning the power of the President over that body was renewed on June 21, 1930 when President Moscicki, without allowing the Diet the opportunity to assemble, prorogued the extraordinary session and set no date for the resumption of its deliberations.⁷⁰ Almost simultaneously he postponed for one month the convocation of the Senate, which had been requested by a petition of 38 of the 111 Senators in accordance with the Constitution.⁷¹ By this action, the constitutional controversy, which had theretofore involved only one house, was broadened to embrace both. In support of his position, Moscicki declared that the existing constitutional precedents dictated the convoking of each chamber by a separate act, and that the criticisms made by the Senators were "inadmissible." From the time of this unilateral interpretation of the Constitution by the President, it

was plain that reconconvocation of the chambers would accomplish nothing; after June 23 a dissolution was inevitable.⁷²

In the face of the suppression of the representative bodies, the deputies and senators of the Socialist, Radical Populist, Moderate Populist, Christian Democratic and National Workers' parties organized a "Congress for the defense of the rights and liberties of the people," convoked at Cracow on June 29, 1930 despite every form of intimidation attempted by the government.⁷³ At this congress the coalition, known as the *Centrolew*, made open demands for the resignation of both Pilsudski and Moscicki, and a return to the paths of constitutional legality. The reply of the government was to issue warrants for the arrest of the organizers, under the provisions of an old Austrian law penalizing written, printed or graphic attacks on the emperor, the integrity of the state, or the form of government or administration of the state.⁷⁴ The Cracow tribunals declared, however, that such indictments as had been submitted to it lacked all juridical foundation.⁷⁵ The stopping of judicial action did not, however, prevent the continuance of administrative repressions.

The action of the government in dealing with the organizers of the Cracow congress caused a dispute in the ranks of the Polish

72. In reply to Moscicki's action the National party issued a declaration noting that "the impossibility evidenced in the last two years of collaboration between the government of Mr. Pilsudski and the majority of the *Sejm* imposes the constitutional necessity of appealing to the will of the nation and ordering new elections. The present *Sejm*, a third of whose mandates were obtained by frauds and violence attested by the Supreme Court, must be dissolved without delay after having deferred to the next Diet the right of constitutional revision." (*Gazeta Warszawska*, June 26, 1930.)

73. "The mystery surrounding the intentions of the government," declared the congress, "the unremitting campaign against the Diet, the violation of the laws and of the constitution, the open and unpunished threats of a coup d'état, the use made, by the governing, of the means and resources of the state for their personal ends . . . keep the country in a perpetual state of unrest and uncertainty, throw the population into anarchy . . . stop economic initiative, increase immeasurably the risks of industry and commerce, alienate foreign capital and cause Polish capital to flee. . . . The *de facto* dictatorship of Joseph Pilsudski, hidden behind the facade of parliamentarism . . . cannot continue longer without bringing the state to a catastrophe. . . . The well known declaration of Joseph Pilsudski that he had 'kept three Diets from working' must appal all citizens, whatever their convictions and their views on the rôle of parliamentarism in reconstituted Poland. We note with sadness that the Chief of State has associated himself with the efforts which tend to render fruitless at all costs the work of the Diet and Senate." (*Robotnik*, June 21, 1930.) The principal means of endeavoring to prevent the Congress were the issuance by government party circles of false manifestoes indicating the breakup of the *Centrolew* coalition, the blocking of highways, the stopping of vehicles bound for Cracow and rigorous police patrol at the gates of the city. Seizure of the principal Opposition newspapers also took place. (Cf. *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 206, August 16, 1930, p. 1.)

74. *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 206, August 16, 1930, p. 5.

75. *Gazeta Warszawska*, July 11, 1930.

69. The reconstruction of Poland was treated in detail by Mildred S. Wertheimer, "The Reconstruction of Poland," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. VI, No. 7, June 11, 1930. The account here given is supplementary thereto.

70. *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 205, July 11, 1930, p. 13.

71. Articles 25 and 37.

legionaries, indicating that the solidarity of the military groups upon which Pilsudski has so depended was not totally unshakeable. A renewal of the agitation of the Center-Left bloc immediately after the Legion congress at Radom brought matters to an open issue: the Slawek cabinet resigned, Pilsudski assumed office with but one change of portfolio, and a militant cabinet was in power, ready to cope alike with the *Centrolew* coalition in domestic politics, and with blustering Hitlerism, and treaty revision in foreign policy.⁷⁶

Undaunted by this move of Pilsudski, the *Centrolew* coalition called for a mass rallying of the democratic groups in twenty-one of the principal cities of the republic on September 14, to demand the convocation of the Diet and the overthrow of the dictatorship.⁷⁷ The immediate countermove of the government was to dissolve both houses, as of August 30, 1930, setting the date of elections to the *Sejm* for November 16, and of those to the Senate for November 23.⁷⁸

"After mature reflection," declared Moscicki in the decree of dissolution, "I have concluded that the most important thing for the work of all citizens of Poland is the reform of the fundamental laws which govern the Republic, the laws constituting the base of all those which exist in the State. The reform is necessary, inasmuch as it has hitherto been impossible to remedy the juridical chaos in which the Republic finds itself. Having convinced myself that I would not be able, in spite of all my efforts, to effect this reform with the aid of the present Diet, I have decided to dissolve the *Sejm* and the Senate."⁷⁹

In so doing, Moscicki and Pilsudski put an end to what even the Opposition declared to be "a state of intolerable incertitude"⁸⁰ and opened an electoral battle unparalleled in the history of the Republic.

THE ELECTIONS

Ten days elapsed before the hand of Pilsudski fell upon the *Centrolew*, which had shown its incapacity to retain a united front in the campaign. Forthwith the leading

deputies of all factions were arrested and sent to the well-known fortress of Brest-Litovsk,⁸¹ while police likewise rounded up over a thousand of their principal supporters throughout the country.⁸² The hand of the military dictatorship fell heaviest, in some respects, upon the Ukrainian deputies from Galicia and the fiery young nationalists of Ukrainian extraction, who resorted throughout the electoral campaign to widespread acts of violence, burning of farms, etc., as a means of attracting international attention and bringing about a change in the Polish attitude towards the Ukrainian minority.⁸³

Although twenty-one electoral tickets were put into the field for the *Sejm* and twelve for the Senate, only three major groupings need to be noted: the "Independent bloc of collaboration with the Government" or Government bloc,⁸⁴ the "Union for the defense of the rights and liberties of the people" or the *Centrolew*,⁸⁵ and the National party,⁸⁶ constituting the Right Opposition. In addition, three Jewish factions and one joint White Russian-Ukrainian grouping presented parliamentary lists.⁸⁷

The result of the elections to both the *Sejm* and the Senate was the triumph of the government bloc, the marked progress of the Right Opposition and the crushing defeat of the parties of the Left and the national minorities.

80. *Messenger Polonais*, September 11, 1930.

81. *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 207, October 7, 1930, p. 6.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 7, and *ibid.*, No. 208, November 4, 1930, p. 7-8.

83. The Government bloc consists of those radicals, conservatives, clericals, and anti-clericals who are "united in the conviction that Marshal Pilsudski is accomplishing a work of public welfare." It has been characterized as made up of "former anti-Russian legionaries, former Austrophil and Germanophil Activists, former revolutionary socialists, great landed proprietors, Catholics, Free Masons, Jewish merchants and heavy industrialists." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

84. This coalition lost its Christian Democratic faction during the campaign and found its Populist elements at complete loggerheads, its "beautiful moral and social program" being thereby vitiated. The arrest of the principal leaders and the persecution of the party press further militated against active cooperation of the Opposition. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

85. This grouping, seriously disciplined since the elections of 1928, forms "a homogeneous party with modern organization, having a single program and obeying a unified command;" is profoundly "republican, anti-German, anti-Semitic, uncompromisingly hostile to the present régime," and untainted by any affiliation with the Left Bloc. *Gazeta Warszawska*, October 8, 1930.

86. *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 208, November 4, 1930, p. 6.

76. *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 207, October 7, 1930, p. 1-5; cf. also *Messenger Polonais*, August 26, 27, 1930.

77. *Robotnik*, August 22, 1930.

78. *Messenger Polonais*, August 30, 1930.

79. *Robotnik*, August 31, 1930.

TABLE II
Polish Parliamentary Elections of 1930

PARTY	VOTE (in thousands)			SEJM			SENATE		
	1928	1930	Loss or gain	1928	1930	Loss or gain	1928	1930	Loss or gain
Government bloc	2,740	5,272	+2,532	125	248	+123	48	76	+28
National	925	1,418	+ 493	38	63	+ 25	9	12	+ 3
Centrolew	3,986	1,861	-2,125	161	80	- 81	27	14	-13
{ Piast	21	15	- 6
{ National Workers	14	8	- 6
{ Peasant	26	18	- 8
{ Wyzwolenie	40	15	- 25
{ Socialists	65	25	- 40
Minorities	2,134	1,517	- 617	81	33	- 14	15	7	- 8
{ Ruthene
{ White Russian	49	21	- 28	11	4	- 7
{ German	19	5	- 14	4	3	- 1
{ Jewish	13	7	- 6
Christian Democrats ..	936	343	- 593	14	14	0	3	2	- 1
Communists	266	170	- 96	7	5	- 2
Miscellaneous	9	0	- 9

In the words of the chief spokesman for the "cabinet of colonels," "The verdict of November 16 definitively struck down the vampire of party oligarchy and parliamentary domination."⁸⁷ But while the elections produced a remarkable gain for the Government bloc, it gained that victory by a large scale process of disfranchisement. The electoral lists of a number of groups were annulled on the eve of the elections, and large numbers of citizens were given either the privilege of abstention—noticeable in the reduced total vote—or that of voting for a different ticket—a process which in large part accounts for the remarkable increase of the National party. When examined in some detail, the electoral figures demonstrate that the Government bloc was most successful in the easternmost portions of the country, and polled the fewest votes on the borders of Germany.⁸⁸ The phenomenal success in the east is explained by the government press as due to a rapid rallying to the Polish Republic and its acting government on the part of the allogeneous minorities in the eastern provinces⁸⁹—an explanation which also covers the crushing of the Cen-

trolew bloc. In Opposition circles astonishment was expressed that the election should have reversed the expression of opinion in the partial elections in the eastern provinces ordered by the Supreme Court in May 1930, after the mandates of 1928 were held by it to have been fraudulently obtained.⁹⁰ It is clear that the electoral methods of the administration in power must be taken into account before attributing to a moral reformation of minorities the crushing victory of the government bloc.

THE MARSHAL AND THE CONSTITUTION

Having brought Poland through the electoral period, and obtained a clear-cut majority for the Government bloc in both houses, Pilsudski left the task of constitutional reform to his colleagues, and on November 29,

90. *Gazeta Warszawska*, November 18, 1930; *Głos Narodu*, November 18, 1930. Imprisonment of candidates, confiscation of newspapers, prohibition of meetings and annulment of electoral lists obtained in the Upper Silesian elections on a more extensive scale than elsewhere. (Cf. *Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 209, December 23, 1930, p. 5-10.)

The adjournment, *sine die*, on July 1, 1930, of the Silesian Dietine elected in May 1930, and not previously convoked, precipitated another, though less serious controversy between the deputies of that body on the one hand and the President of the Republic and M. Grazyński, the *voyevod* of Silesia on the other. It was charged by supporters of the Dietine that the budgets for 1929 and 1930 had been "steam-rolled" through by a select "Council of the Voyevodship." (Cf. *ibid.*, No. 204, p. 10; No. 206, p. 8.) Subsequently, on September 25, 1930, President Moscicki dissolved the Dietine, which had not been allowed to meet, and ordered new elections for November 23.

RESULTS OF ELECTIONS TO THE SILESIA DIETINE

Groups	1928	1930
Government bloc	10	19
Christian Democrats	16	19
Polish and German Socialist bloc	5	3
German bloc	15	7
Communists	2	0

There was 90 per cent participation in the elections. (*Messenger Polonais*, November 24, 1930.)

The treatment of the German population during this period was the subject of extended discussion by the League of Nations Council in its meeting in January 1931.

87. *Gazeta Polska*, November 18, 1930.

88. "The victory of the government list, often feeble or totally ineffective in the western provinces where the ethnologically Polish element is very dense, was crushing in the territories of the East, where, in many places, it gained 100 per cent of the votes cast." (*Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise*, No. 209, December 23, 1930, p. 4.)

89. "The people have learned," declared *Polska*, a Catholic journal (November 26, 1930), "that the game was dangerous and this time they have not supported the fomenters of anarchy. That is the real cause of the failure of the minority lists."

1930 resigned both his membership in the *Sejm* and his position as Premier, turning the government back to Colonel Slawek. On the eve of his departure for an extended rest, Pilsudski outlined once more the character of the new constitution he desired.⁹¹ Pilsudski's colleagues considered, however, that alteration of the existing instrument would suffice. In consequence a compromise text was drafted which was presented to the *Sejm* on March 2, 1931.⁹² According to its terms, the presidential office would be exalted from the position given it under the Constitution of 1921 to a powerful septennate, based on direct election. The President would become the highest representative of the power of the Polish state; he would no longer be dependent either for election or power upon Parliament. Endowed with a far-reaching ordinance power, with the power of convoking and dissolving Parliament, vetoing laws passed by it, appointing ministers and judges, and signing and ratifying treaties without the approval of Parliament, he would become a constitutional autocrat, centralizing executive authority in his person and making both legislative and judicial branches his subordinates. The cabinet would be responsible only to him, and not to the *Sejm*, although a concession to the forms of parliamentarism was left in the provision that the *Sejm* could, by an absolute majority vote, make the government resign. Special procedure on motions of censure was, however, provided to make more difficult even this moderate degree of parliamentary control. As a final weapon against the *Sejm*, a new Senate, composed of 150 members, one-third of whom would be presidential appointees, was proposed. The project was clearly intended to stabilize the dictatorship in Poland by endowing the President with extraordinary powers.⁹³ When viewed objectively, the proposal introduces little that is new in Polish constitutional practice, save

the formal veto, the autocratic control of foreign affairs, and the puppet Senate. Practically all the other features of the textual proposals are implicit in the present alignment of constitutional forces. A new instrument cast in such a form, would, therefore, merely canonize reality.

PRESENT PROBLEMS CONFRONTING POLAND

Poland has now passed a full decade in complete independence—almost fifteen years in some degree of autonomy. In that time her institutions have undergone only superficial evolution; parliamentarism and democracy have not struck root. Beset by the problems of alien and unassimilated minorities, she has followed the course of coercion and oppression. The preponderance of strength on the side of the Polish elements in the state, backed by the organized might of the bureaucracy and the army, is so great that a policy of open resistance seems destined to be uniformly unsuccessful. It is altogether likely that the passive loyalty of the devoutly Catholic or Orthodox populations in her Eastern provinces is partly induced by the fact of the intense suffering of their co-religionists on the other side of the Soviet frontier; in the case of the German and Ukrainian minorities such forces are not nearly so operative, and the happier lot of their co-nationals in Germany and Czechoslovakia respectively serves as a constant standard of unfavorable comparison. The structure of the Polish state today is still in flux, inasmuch as Poland is undergoing a type of renovation, socially and economically, which cannot be effected overnight. That is why a bureaucracy and a military hierarchy serve as the principal pillars of the state, which is neither the paradise of landed magnates that it was before the World War, nor the full-rounded industrial commonwealth that may yet be in the making. In this period of basic social and economic transition, Poland finds her governmental functioning still dependent upon the tradition of racial supremacy, militant nationalism, bureaucratic omnipotence and ecclesiastical politics that was the mainstay of a now extinct Austria-Hungary. Such are, at least, among the principal bases of power in the Polish Republic.

91. For a summary of the plan laid before the *Sejm* by the Government bloc in the spring of 1929, cf. Wertheimer, "The Reconstruction of Poland," cited, p. 148. For Pilsudski's proposed reforms, cf. *Gazeta Polska*, November 27 and 29, 1930.

92. *New York Times*, March 4, 1931. Debate on the Government bloc proposals began on March 3, 1931 in the *Sejm*. The representatives of all the Opposition parties announced at that time that they would refuse to cooperate in amending the Constitution, inasmuch as they believed economic matters demanded prior consideration. (Cf. *The Times*, London, March 4, 1931.)

93. Poland here follows the trend in Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia and Finland, and the analogous movements already observed in Estonia and Latvia.

CONCLUSION

The major fact of the post-war period in the region embraced by the succession states of the Russian Empire is their inclusion in the life of Western Europe. Heretofore borderlands of empire, suffering under oppression yet quick with nascent nationalism, they have come into their own in the past decade and swung into the orbit of Europe, not of Moscow. This shift in their orientation has pushed eastward the boundaries of Europe proper and forced a readjustment of retarded regions to the ideology and cadence of Westernism. Emerging from a common historical experience of subjection to Russia, they have travelled radically different paths from those traversed by the peoples and communities making up the Soviet Union. To attain and maintain stability in a region bordering a land of revolution has involved a fundamental change in the culture pattern of these peoples.

In the foregoing pages the principal devices used by each in the quest for stability have been noted: the constitutional mechanism, intended to inaugurate a régime of liberal legality; the agrarian reform, designed to produce a stable, land-owning class content with semi-pastoral existence; the weaving of a national character on the loom of common experience in school, in field, in army and in church. The product, given the different strands in the stuff and fabric of each nation, has been far from uniform. Stability is not inertia or stagnation; it is the product of practical correlation of the various elements operative in national life. Stability may still exist in the presence of conflicting forces, barely held within the bond of legality by the constitutional mechanism: here it requires marked adaptability to solve the problems of the day without the use of brute force. Again, high stability may exist where there is homogeneity in the body politic and little diversity in the social structure. In such a case the very

absence of conflicting elements creates balance. Finally, there is the sham stability of external order maintained by authoritarianism, unconstitutionality and sheer force. Where such conditions subsist, there can scarcely be appeal to the conceptions of legality; force creates counterforce and instability.

One evanescent thread runs through the pattern of the collective behavior of the border peoples: Bred in resentment of autocratic authority, they first endeavored, by constitutional restrictions, to whittle governmental power down toward the vanishing point; then, even when the necessity of efficient action was borne in upon them by the hard lessons of experience, they endeavored to delay by every means the growth of strong—and therefore (to them) irresponsible—executives. The quest of the last half decade has been a mental groping for a new conception of executive authority, for the vesting of power in an administration that can keep pace with the tempo of a changing age. It is largely as the power of efficient governmental action is brought into cadence with the march of economic life that the question of authority can be settled. If the harmonization is consciously facilitated by the collaboration of cabinets and parliaments, stability is attained by constitutional means. It is where the hope of collective salvation is mistakenly placed by parliaments and peoples in the historic policy of attrition that constitutional authority gives way and authoritarianism rides roughshod over public liberties in the attempt to trail the careening chariot of economic life. To attain stability and balance, to solve within the framework of legality the major aspects of their respective adjustment to the complex of an independent life, to perfect from indigenous resources the culture pattern of liberated nationality—such have been the basic problems of the new commonwealths of Eastern Europe.